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1.- Introduction 
In April 2016, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published online an article entitled “Single-
world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent”, in which they introduced a 
Gedankenexperiment that led them to conclude that, if “quantum theory is applied to model an 
experimenter who herself uses quantum theory”, then “no single-world interpretation can be 
logically consistent.” (Frauchiger and Renner 2016: 1). That argument intended to support the 
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, to the extent that it would force us “to give up 
the view that there is one single reality.” (Frauchiger and Renner 2016: 22). In a new version of the 
paper, now entitled “Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself” and published in 
Nature Communications in September 2018, the authors moderate their original claim. In this new 
version, the same Gedankenexperiment is proposed to “investigate the question whether quantum 
theory can, in principle, have universal validity”, and the conclusion is “that quantum theory cannot 
be extrapolated to complex systems, at least not in a straightforward manner.” (Frauchiger and 
Renner 2018: 1); on this basis, the authors consider how the different interpretations of standard 
quantum mechanics and the different quantum theories should face their result. 
Since its first online publication, the Frauchiger and Renner (F-R) argument has caused quite 
a splash in the field of quantum foundations. In general, it has been considered as a new no-go result 
for quantum mechanics. For instance, in the website of the Perimeter Institute of Theoretical 
Physics one can find a video of the talk entitled “Frauchiger-Renner no-go theorem for single-world 
interpretations of quantum theory”, given by Lidia del Rio (2016) only two months after the original 
publication, in June 2016. But, in many cases, more extreme reactions can be found, based on 
conceiving the F-R argument as a kind of proof of the inconsistence of quantum mechanics. This 
idea, for instance, is suggested by a post of the Department of Physics of the ETH Zürich (the 
university to which Frauchiger and Renner belong), motivated by the recent publication of the 
paper; that post, entitled “Searching for errors in the quantum world” (Würsten 2018), asks “How is 
it possible for a theory to be inconsistent when it has repeatedly been so clearly confirmed by 
experiments?” (the post is reproduced in the website of Science Daily). In turn, with the title 
“Reimagining of Schrödinger’s cat breaks quantum mechanics —and stumps physicists” 
(Castelvecchi 2018), an article appeared in the section “News” of Nature (the article is reproduced 
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in Scientific American). And if one does not restrict the attention to highly reputed journals and 
websites, it turns to be impossible to keep track of the huge number of comments to the new result 
in other websites and personal blogs. 
The immense impact of Frauchiger and Renner’s work is due to the fact that their argument is 
neutral regarding interpretation: on the basis of three very generic and seemingly reasonable 
assumptions that do not include interpretive premises, the argument leads to a contradiction. This 
fact is viewed as pointing to a deep shortcoming of quantum mechanics itself, which contrasts with 
the extraordinary success of the theory. 
In this article we will focus on the published version of the paper. Our purpose is not to 
consider and analyze all the comments of Frauchiger and Renner’s work since it was proposed, 
because this would be an unattainable task. Our aim is to offer a careful reconstruction of the F-R 
argument, which in general is not elucidated with sufficient detail in the many debates about its 
assumptions and scope. Such a reconstruction will allow us to show that: (i) the argument can be 
more clearly formulated with no reference to what subjects know or see, but rather only in terms of 
quantum propositions, (ii) in contrast to what some commentators suppose, the argument does not 
require the hypothesis of collapse to arrive to its conclusion, and (iii) the contradiction resulting 
from the F-R argument is inferred by making classical conjunctions between different and 
incompatible contexts. On the basis of this clarification, we will finally argue that the conclusion of 
the F-R argument is not as novel and original as its great impact might make us to suppose. 
2.- The experimental setup and a first approach to the argument 
The Gedankenexperiment proposed in Frauchiger and Renner’s article is a sophisticated 
reformulation of Wigner’s friend experiment (Wigner 1961). In that original thought experiment, 
Wigner considers the superposition state of a particle in a closed laboratory where his friend is 
confined. When Wigner’s friend measures the particle, the state collapses to one of its components. 
However, from the outside of the laboratory, Wigner still assigns a superposition state to the whole 
composite system particle+friend+laboratory.  
The F-R argument relies on duplicating Wigner’s setup. Let us consider two friends F1 and F2 
located in separate and isolated labs L1 and L2 respectively, where the labs are represented by the 
Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 respectively.1 F1 measures the observable C of a biased “quantum coin” 
in the state ( ) ( )1 3 2 3+h t , where h  and t  are the eigenstates of C, and h and t are its 
respective eigenvalues. F1 prepares a qubit in the state ↓  if the outcome is h, or in the state →  if 
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the outcome is t, and sends it to F2. When F2 receives the qubit, she measures its observable Sz. 
After these two measurements, the state of the whole system composite of the two labs is: 
1 2
1 2
33
Ψ = ⇓ + ⇒ ∈ ⊗H T H H                 (1) 
where  
• H  and T , eigenstates of an observable A with eigenvalues H and T, are the states of the entire 
lab L1 when the outcome of F1’s measurement is h and t, respectively, 
• ⇑  and ⇓ , eigenstates of an observable B with eigenvalues ⇑  and ⇓ , are the states of the 
entire lab L2 when the outcome of F2’s measurement is 1 2+  and 1 2− , respectively,  
• and ( )1 2⇒ = ⇑ + ⇓ . 
The Gedankenexperiment continues by considering two “Wigner” observers, W1 and W2, 
located outside the labs, who will respectively measure the observables X and Y of labs L1 and L2: 
• X has eigenvalues failX and ok X , with respective eigenvectors failX  and ok X  such that: 
( )1fail
2
= +X H T   ( )1ok 2= −X H T             (2) 
• Y has eigenvalues failY and okY , with respective eigenvectors failY  and okY , such that: 
( )1fail
2
= ⇓ + ⇑Y    ( )1ok 2= ⇓ − ⇑Y              (3) 
Before analyzing the consequences of the experiment, Frauchiger and Renner point out that 
their argument can be conceived as a no-go theorem that proves that three “natural-sounding” 
assumptions, (Q), (C), and (S), cannot all be valid (2018: 2):  
(Q) Compliance with quantum theory: Quantum mechanics is universally valid, that is, 
it applies to systems of any complexity, including observers. Moreover, an agent knows 
that a given proposition is true whenever the Born rule assigns probability 1 to it. 
(C) Self-consistency: Different agents’ predictions are not contradictory. 
(S) Single-world: From the viewpoint of an agent who carries out a particular 
measurement, this measurement has one single outcome. 
In the 2016 paper, Frauchiger and Renner implicitly consider (Q) and (C) as unavoidable: as a 
consequence, they claim that their argument shows that “no single-world interpretation can be 
logically consistent” (2016: 1) and, therefore, “we are forced to give up the view that there is one 
single reality” (2016: 22). By contrast, in the 2018 paper, they stress that “[t]he theorem itself is 
neutral in the sense that it does not tell us which of these three assumptions is wrong” (2018: 2); as 
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a consequence, they admit the possibility of different theoretical and interpretive viewpoints 
regarding their result, and include a table that shows which of the three assumptions each 
interpretation or quantum theory violates (2018: 9). 
On the basis of the above elements —experimental setup and assumptions— the F-R 
argument proceeds as follows. First, in order to compute the probability that the measurements of X 
and Y yield the results ok X  and okY , respectively, the state described by eq. (1) must be expressed 
as: 
1 1 1 3
ok ok ok fail fail ok fail fail
412 12 12
Ψ = − + +X Y X Y X Y X Y    (4) 
From this eq. (4) it is clear that the probability of obtaining ok X  and okY  is 1/12. 
The second part of the argument consists in showing that the observers involved in the 
experiment can draw a conclusion different from the above one on the basis of the following 
reasoning.2 Let us consider the probability that F2 obtains 1 2−  in her Sz measurement and W1 
obtains ok X  in her X measurement; in order to compute this probability, the state described by eq. 
(1) must be expressed as: 
2 1 1fail fail ok
3 6 6
Ψ = ⇓ + ⇑ − ⇑X X X              (5) 
From this eq. (5) it is easy to see that the considered probability is zero. Then, if W1 obtains ok X  in 
her X measurement on Lab L1, she can infer that the outcome of F2’s Sz measurement on the qubit 
was 1 2+ . In turn, if F2 obtains 1 2+  in her Sz measurement on the qubit, she can infer that the 
outcome of F1’s C measurement on the quantum coin was t, because otherwise F1 would send F2 
the qubit in state ↓ . And if F1 obtains t in her C measurement on the quantum coin, she can infer 
that the outcome of W2’s Y measurement on Lab L2 will be failY , because the outcome t is perfectly 
correlated with the state ⇒  of lab L2, and fail⇒ = Y  (see eq. (3)). Therefore, from a nested 
reasoning it can be concluded that, when W1 gets ok X , she can infer that W2 certainly gets failY . 
But this conclusion contradicts what was inferred from eq. (4), that is, that there is a non-zero 
probability that W1 gets ok X  and W2 gets okY . 
The reactions to the F-R argument have been multiple and varied. An interesting response 
emphasizes an implicit assumption of the argument: the non-relational view of quantum mechanics 
is an indispensable premise of the derivation. This is the view of Časlav Brukner, who considers, 
from an operational perspective, that the self-consistency condition (C) is too restrictive, since “the 
states referring to outcomes of different observers in a Wigner-friend type of experiment cannot be 
                                                 
2
 We thank Jeffrey Bub for suggesting us this clear explanation of this part of the argument. 
 5
defined without referring to the specific experimental arrangements of the observers, in agreement 
with Bohr’s idea of contextuality” (Brukner 2018: 8). From a non-operational standpoint, Dennis 
Dieks (2019) advocates, in the line of Carlo Rovelli’s relational view (1996), for a perspectivalist 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which more than one state can be assigned to the 
same physical system: the state and physical properties of a system are different in relation to 
different reference systems; when the perspectival nature of quantum states is included as a 
premise, no contradiction can be inferred from the F-R argument. According to Richard Healey 
(2018), the F-R argument implicitly depends on an inconclusive additional assumption, 
“intervention insensitivity”, which guarantees that the truth-value of the outcome of a 
counterfactual measurement is insensitive to the occurrence of a physically isolated intervening 
event. 
After supplying his clear and elegant reconstruction of the F-R argument as appeared in the 
2016 paper, Jeffrey Bub (2018) claims that what he calls the “Frauchiger-Renner contradiction” 
shows that quantum mechanics should be understood probabilistically, as a new sort of non-
Boolean probability theory, rather than representationally, as a theory about the elementary 
constituents of the physical world and how these elements evolve dynamically over time. In 
resonance with his information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics, Bub conceives 
quantum mechanics formulated in Hilbert space as fundamentally a theory of probabilistic 
correlations that are structurally different from the correlations that arise in Boolean theories. 
Analogously to special relativity, as a theory about the structure of space-time that provides an 
explanation for length contraction and time dilation through the geometry of Minkowski space-time 
with no dynamical considerations, “[q]uantum mechanics, as a theory about randomness and 
nonlocality, provides an explanation for probabilistic constraints on events through the geometry of 
Hilbert space, but that’s as far as it goes.” (Bub 2018: 3). 
From a completely different perspective, the conclusion of the F-R argument was rejected on 
the basis of Bohmian mechanics, the paradigmatic one-world no-collapse quantum theory. For 
instance, Anthony Sudbery (2017) offers a Bell-Bohmian reconstruction of the argument, claiming 
that it supplies a counter-example to the conclusion obtained by Frauchiger and Renner. With a 
similar reasoning, Dustin Lazarovici and Mario Hubert (2018) assert that any Bohm-type theory 
provides a logically consistent description of F-R Gedankenexperiment if the state of the entire 
system and the effects of all measurements are taken into account. 
Since our discussion will be centered on the second part of the F-R argument, let us write it in 
a more concise form: 
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(a)  If W1 gets ok X , then she knows that F2 got 1 2+ . 
(b)  If F2 gets 1 2+ , then she knows that F1 got t. 
(c)  If F1 gets t, then she knows that W2 will get failY . 
(d)  If W1 gets ok X , then she knows that W2 gets failY . 
where (a), (b), and (c) are the premises of the reasoning, and (d) is its conclusion. In the following 
sections we will analyze this second part of the F-R argument from different perspectives. 
3.- What does transitivity mean? 
The first issue that arises when one faces the consistency condition is the question of what system 
of logic underlies the second part of the F-R argument. They seem to use a “folk” logic that makes 
plausible to infer the conclusion (d) from the three premises (a), (b), and (c). But, as it is already 
well known, this intuitive strategy is very dangerous in the quantum domain. 
But the situation is even more confusing. In fact, the reasoning involves the application of a 
kind of transitivity according to which, from the proposition 
If W1 gets ok X , then W1 knows that F2 knows that F1 knows that W2 gets failY  
it can be inferred that 
If W1 gets ok X , then W1 knows that W2 gets failY  
This requires assuming that the following inference is valid:  
‘A knows that B knows that C knows p’  implies that  ‘A knows p’        (6) 
Surely somebody made Frauchiger and Renner to notice that they were not using a classical 
transitivity inference rule, because in a footnote of the published paper they stress: “Assumption (C) 
has some vague similarities with a transitivity relation. However, although the expression «knows 
that» indeed defines a binary relation, it is not transitive (for its domain and codomain are different 
sets).” (2018: 7). But if the argument does not rely on transitivity, which inference rule allows us to 
accept inference (6) as valid? 
The question about the validity of inference (6) is relevant because, as stressed in logics, the 
verb ‘to know’ (as other verbs such as ‘to believe’, ‘to hope’, ‘to hate’, etc.) expresses a 
propositional attitude that generates an opaque context, that is, a linguistic context in which not 
always co-referential terms can be substituted salva veritate. For instance, although ‘Lewis Carroll 
is Charles Dodgson’, it may happen that the proposition ‘John knows that Lewis Carroll was the 
author of Alice in Wonderland’ is true, but the proposition ‘John knows that Charles Dodgson was 
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the author of Alice in Wonderland’ is false. In turn, it may happen that ‘John knows that Mary 
knows her passport number’ is true, but ‘John knows Mary’s passport number’ is false. In our case, 
from obtaining t in her C measurement, F1 knows that the state of Lab L2 will be ⇒ ; but even if 
W1 knows that F1 knows that the state of Lab L2 will be ⇒ , W1 may ignore that the state of Lab L2 
will be failY , in spite of the fact that if fail⇒ = Y . 
These logical considerations do not intend, per se, to dispute the validity of the F-R argument, 
but rather point to the need for reformulating it in a more precise form. In particular, the argument 
can be expressed with no reference to what the involved subjects know, but in terms of what the 
observers get in their measurements. For instance, Bruckner, although still talking about 
“«collapsing» others’ knowledge into W’s knowledge” (2018: 8), and considering that the F-R 
argument “points to the necessity to differentiate between ones’ knowledge about direct 
observations and ones’ knowledge about others’ knowledge that is compatible with physical 
theories” (2018: 8), reconstructs the argument under the following form (with the necessary 
terminology adjustment): 
(a’)  If W1 sees ok X , then F2 sees 1 2+ . 
(b’)  If F2 sees 1 2+ , then F1 sees t. 
(c’)  If F1 sees t, then W2 sees failY . 
(d’)  If W1 sees ok X , then W2 sees failY . 
In this case, any reference to knowledge has vanished:3 the three premises (a’), (b’), and (c’) are 
conditional propositions, and the conclusion (d’) is obtained by applying the classical inference rule 
of the transitivity of conditional. 
With this reformulation of the second part of the F-R argument we are in a better position than 
in the previous case. However, it is not completely clear yet why we should accept the truth of the 
three premises. In particular, does the fact that the observers get precise values in measurements 
presuppose collapse? 
4.- Single outcome versus collapse 
The Frauchiger and Renner’s article is confusing enough as to make difficult to decide at first sight 
whether the argument requires collapse or not. Several authors claim that the F-R argument does not 
include the hypothesis of collapse as one of its assumptions, and a significant part of its conceptual 
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value relies on this fact. For example, Dieks (2019) understands the argument as based on unitary 
evolution for the dynamics of the quantum state, also during the measurement process. Bub, in turn, 
notes that the formalism used by Frauchiger and Renner does not presuppose “a suspension of 
unitary evolution in favor of an unexplained «collapse» of the quantum state.” (Bub 2018: 2). 
However, not everybody agrees with this view. For instance, Franck Laloë considers that the 
argument illustrates no inconsistency in quantum mechanics, but only the well-known fact that “the 
exact point at which the von Neumann reduction postulate should be applied is ill defined.” (Laloë 
2018: 1). Mateus Araújo (2018), in turn, finds “the flaw in Frauchiger and Renner’s argument” in 
the fact that the predictions that Frauchiger and Renner claim to follow from quantum mechanics 
can only be obtained when collapse is added. These opinions are not completely unfounded on the 
basis of the article’s content. In fact, the entire explanation of the “Wigner’s friend paradox” 
included in the Introduction of the 2018 article presupposes collapse in measurements, and the new 
Gedankenexperiment is presented as an extension of Wigner’s one, without pointing out any other 
difference. Moreover, all along the development of the no-go theorem, the hypothesis of collapse is 
not discussed, not even mentioned. After a long discussion with Renner, Araújo (2018: Update) 
concluded that Renner thinks that the assumption of collapse in measurement is just a part of 
quantum mechanics, so it doesn’t need to be stated separately. 
In the light of this divergence of opinions, the first point to emphasize is that the single-world 
assumption (S) does not amount to nor implies collapse. Whereas the hypothesis of collapse 
imposes the non-unitary modification of the system’s state due to measurement, (S) says nothing 
about the system’s state. (S) only establishes that any measurement has a single outcome, and this 
may happen even if the system persists in its unitary evolution, as in the case, for example, of the 
modal interpretations (see Lombardi and Dieks 2017). Once this is clearly understood, it can be 
formally proved that the F-R argument does not require the hypothesis of collapse to reach its 
conclusion.  
In order to develop the proof, first let us clean the discourse of any reference to observers and 
what they know or see, since quantum mechanics, as a physical theory, does not talk about the 
mental or visual states of agents. For this purpose, we will reformulate the F-R argument in terms of 
quantum propositions of the form ‘the property P has the value p’, which will be represented as ‘
:P p ’ for conciseness. From now on, we will use the symbols ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, and ‘↔’ for 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional, and biconditional respectively, as usual.  
On the basis of these clarifications, the first part of the F-R argument leads to the conclusion 
that the following proposition can be asserted: 
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: ok : ok∧X YX Y                         (7) 
On the other hand, the second part of the F-R argument is a reasoning that reads: 
(a’’)  : ok : 1 2→ +X zX S  
(b’’)  : 1 2 :+ →zS C t  
(c’’)  : : fail→ YC t Y  
(d’’)  : ok : fail→X YX Y  
By defining → in terms of ∧, and by considering that failY  and okY  are the two only eigenvalues of 
Y, conclusion (d’’) can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ): ok : fail : ok : fail : ok : ok→ ≡ ¬ ∧ ¬ ≡ ¬ ∧X Y X Y X YX Y X Y X Y       (8) 
The contradiction of the F-R argument results from eqs. (7) and (8). QED 
Now, the F-R argument is formulated in a sufficiently clear way so as to formally prove that 
the involved propositions can be asserted without assuming collapse, but only accepting assumption 
(Q): a quantum proposition can be asserted/denied when the Born rule assigns probability 1/0 to it. 
The proof requires recalling that the eigenstates/eigenvalues of the observable A of lab L1 are 
correlated with the eigenstates/eigenvalues of the observable C of the coin, and the 
eigenstates/eigenvalues of the observable B of lab L2 are correlated with the eigenstates/ 
eigenvalues of the observable Sz of the qubit: 
: :↔C h A H     : :↔C t A T                   (9) 
: 1 2 :+ ↔ ⇑zS B    : 1 2 :− ↔ ⇓zS B                  (10) 
• Proposition (7) can be asserted in some situations because ( )Pr : ok : ok 1 12∧ =X YX Y , which is 
implied by eq. (4). 
• Proposition (a’’) can be transformed by taking into account eqs. (10), the definition of → in terms 
of ∧, and the fact that ⇑  and ⇓  are the only two eigenvalues of B: 
( ) ( ): ok : 1 2 : ok : : ok : : ok :→ + ≡ → ⇑ ≡ ¬ ∧ ¬ ⇑ ≡ ¬ ∧ ⇓X z X X XX S X B X B X B  (11) 
In order to assert ( ): ok :¬ ∧ ⇓XX B , it must be proved that ( )Pr : ok : 0∧ ⇓ =XX B , which in 
turn requires to express the state Ψ  in the basis X-B of 1 2⊗H H  as follows: 
2 1 1fail fail ok
3 6 6
Ψ = ⇓ + ⇑ − ⇑X X X              (12) 
• Proposition (b’’) can be transformed by taking into account eqs. (9) and (10), again the definition 
of → in terms of ∧, and the fact that T  and H  are the two only eigenvalues of A: 
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( ) ( ): 1 2 : : : : : : :+ → ≡ ⇑→ ≡ ¬ ⇑ ∧ ¬ ≡ ¬ ⇑ ∧zS C t B A T B A T B A H      (13) 
In order to assert ( ): :¬ ⇑ ∧B A H , it must be proved that ( )Pr : : 0⇑ ∧ =B A H , which in turn 
requires to express the state Ψ  in the basis B-A of 1 2⊗H H  as follows: 
1 1 1
3 3 3
Ψ = ⇓ + ⇑ + ⇓H T T                 (14) 
• Proposition (c’’) can be transformed by taking into account eqs. (9), again the definition of → in 
terms of ∧, and the fact that failY  and okY  are the two only eigenvalues of Y: 
( ) ( ): : fail : : fail : : fail : : ok→ ≡ → ≡ ¬ ∧ ¬ ≡ ¬ ∧Y Y Y YC t Y A T Y A T Y A T Y    (15) 
In order to assert ( ): : ok¬ ∧ YA T Y , it must be proved that ( )Pr : : ok 0∧ =YA T Y , which, in 
turn, requires to express the state Ψ  in the basis A-Y of 1 2⊗H H  as follows: 
1 1 2fail ok fail
36 6
Ψ = + +Y Y YH H T              (16) 
Summing up, the propositions involved in the F-R argument can be inferred from the formalism of 
standard quantum mechanics without appealing to the hypothesis of collapse or to any other 
assumption about measurement. The only “trick” is to bring into play cases of probability equal to 
zero or to one. 
Let us recall that in the original Wigner’s friend argument, the paradox arises when 
comparing the collapsed state of the friend inside the lab and the superposition assigned by Wigner 
from the outside. If the conclusion of the F-R argument depended on collapse, it would lose much 
of its appealing since it would offer no much novelty when compared with the original Wigner’s 
friend argument and would depend on an interpretive assumption. By contrast, what has shocked 
most of the physics community is that the argument seems to show an internal inconsistency of 
quantum mechanics at the level of probabilities, independently of any interpretive addition. 
5.- Using classical logic in a quantum context 
Up to this point we have seen that the F-R argument leads to a contradiction without appealing to 
observers’ states of consciousness, memory, or knowledge, and without introducing the collapse 
hypothesis. This suggests that we are facing a really new and powerful no-go theorem. However, 
there are good reasons to suspect that, although the theorem is powerful, it is not substantially new.  
In fact, in the discussions around the argument, few authors stress with sufficient strength that 
it is based on inferences belonging to classical logic. An exception is Bruckner, who, still talking 
about knowledge instead of about quantum propositions and without a full proof, points out that 
“«collapsing» others’ knowledge into W’s knowledge […] is equivalent in its implications to 
 11
considering all the statements as belonging to a single Boolean algebra” (2018: 8). The detailed 
reconstruction of the previous section makes easy to see why. In the reasoning of the second part of 
the F-R argument, the conclusion (d’’) is obtained by applying the classical inference rule of 
transitivity of conditional, according to which, from ( ) ( )→ ∧ →p q q r , ( )→p r  can be inferred. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make the conjunction between the conditional propositions (a’’), (b’’), 
and (c’’) in order to obtain (d’’) by transitivity. Each one of those propositions was obtained from a 
probabilistic assertion that was computed by expressing the state Ψ  in a different basis of the 
Hilbert space 1 2⊗H H  of the system composite of the two labs L1 and L2: the bases X-B, B-A, and 
A-Y for (a’’), (b’’), and (c’’) respectively (see eqs. (12), (14), and (16) respectively). But they are 
three different bases, rotated with respect to each other.4 In other words, arriving at the 
contradiction by means of the F-R argument requires making classical conjunctions between 
propositions corresponding to different contexts, something that the non-Boolean structure of the 
quantum propositions forbids, as it is well-known since 1967, when Simon Kochen and Ernst 
Specker demonstrated their famous theorem. 
Let us recall that the F-R argument is built on three assumptions: it would show that accepting 
(Q), (C), and (S) leads to a contradiction. In which of the three assumptions is the admissibility of 
conjunctions between propositions corresponding to different contexts included? Given the content 
of (Q) and (S), it seems plausible that such a logical admissibility is included in assumption (C), 
which “demands consistency, in the sense that the different agents’ predictions are not 
contradictory” (Frauchiger and Renner 2018: 2). So, let us focus our attention on it. 
According to Frauchiger and Renner (2018: 7, caption of Figure 3), “If a theory T (such as 
quantum theory) enables consistent reasoning (C) then it must allow any agent A to promote the 
conclusions drawn by another agent A’ to his own conclusions, provided that A’ has the same initial 
knowledge about the experiment and reasons within the same theory T.” This means that, if the 
shared initial knowledge is accepted, (C) requires that two agents (i) reason with the same theory T, 
and (ii) use the same system of logic to obtain their conclusions. But, what is the relation between a 
theory T —in this case, a physical theory as quantum mechanics— and the system of logic by 
means of which the agents draw their own conclusions? One alternative is to consider that the 
theory T is constituted by a mathematical structure and some postulates, and the logic by means of 
which the agents make inferences on the basis of the theory is classical, defined on a Boolean 
structure of propositions. This is the strategy followed by Frauchiger and Renner, who rely on the 
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 The fact that the bases X-B, B-A, and A-Y are different can be proved by defining three observables XBO , 
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respectively, and by proving that those three observables do not commute with each other.  
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mathematical structure of quantum mechanics and the Born Rule as one of its postulates, but allow 
the agents to use classical logic to make their inferences. On this basis, they prove that accepting the 
assumptions (Q) —compliance with T=quantum theory—, (S) —single outcomes of measurements 
or single truth values of propositions—, and (C) —that the agents make inferences on the basis of 
T=quantum theory with classical logic— leads to a contradiction. But this is a direct consequence 
of the Kochen-Specker theorem. Therefore, according to this view, the F-R argument is an original 
and interesting way to get a result already obtained by other means. In other words, the argument is 
a no-go theorem, but what does not go was already well known and supplies no new knowledge 
about quantum mechanics —and even less offers a proof of an internal inconsistence of the theory. 
However, there is another alternative regarding how to conceive the relation between a theory 
T and the system of logic by means of which inferences are made. In fact, it can be considered that 
a physical theory T constrains the range of systems of logic that can be used to make inferences 
with its propositions. In other words, the mathematical structure of the theory T embodies the 
algebra of T-propositions, which restricts the admissible logic to operate with those propositions. 
Therefore, in the case of quantum mechanics, making inferences with classical logic on quantum 
propositions is not legitimate, because it is in conflict with the non-Boolean algebra of those 
propositions. This would be the position taken by a professor who, in an exam on quantum 
mechanics, rejected a student’s answer that includes a conjunction of propositions corresponding to 
the values of non-commuting observables. From this viewpoint, the F-R argument is illegitimate, to 
the extent that it assumes compliance with quantum theory by (Q), but according to (C) allows the 
agents to make inferences with classical logic. 
There are, then, two alternatives to assess the F-R argument: legitimate but not new, or 
perhaps new but not legitimate. Although we have our own preference for one of the two 
alternatives, we let the readers free to make their decisions. But what seems quite clear is that, in 
neither of the two cases the F-R argument provides a result that shakes the foundations of quantum 
mechanics. 
6.- Conclusions 
The wide and strong impact of the F-R argument is undeniable, not only for the high number of 
comments that appeared under different forms since its first presentation in 2016, but also for the 
severe consequences for the foundations of the theory that it supposedly involves. In the 
foundations of physics community, the argument has been largely discussed from different 
viewpoints and on the basis of very different interpretations of the proposal. The disagreements 
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about which the assumptions actually are and what the argument really proves are a manifestation 
of the fact that the presentation of the argument might be clearer than it is.  
In this brief article we have analyzed the F-R argument, with the purpose of offering a 
detailed reconstruction that can be helpful for future discussions. On the basis of this reconstruction 
we have shown that the argument can be formulated only in terms of quantum propositions, in such 
a way that any ambiguity or confusion derived from introducing what subjects know or see in the 
reasoning can be avoided. In addition, our reconstruction has allowed us to prove, in a precise 
formal way, that the argument does not require the hypothesis of collapse to arrive to its conclusion: 
the propositions that take part of the argument are asserted/denied when the Born rule assigns 
probability 1/0 to them, without supposing that the state evolves non-unitarily in the measurement 
process. Finally, we have shown that the contradiction resulting from the F-R argument is inferred 
by making classical conjunctions between different and incompatible contexts, a strategy that stands 
in conflict with the well-known contextuality of quantum mechanics derived from the non-Boolean 
structure of quantum propositions. This fact leaves us with two alternatives, depending on how we 
conceive the relation between a physical theory T and the system of logic supporting inferences on 
T-propositions: either the F-R argument is an original way to reproduce the proof of the 
contextuality of quantum mechanics, or the argument is illegitimate because appeals to inferences 
forbidden by the algebraic structure of quantum propositions. In both cases, the F-R argument lacks 
the high conceptual relevance suggested by its great impact under the form of comments, 
discussions, and even alarmist claims about the “breaking” or the “inconsistence” of quantum 
mechanics.  
Acknowledgements: We are extremely grateful to Dennis Dieks for encouraging us to write down 
these ideas, and to Jeffrey But for his enlightening comments to a previous version of the present 
article. 
References 
Araújo, M. (2018), “The flaw in Frauchiger and Renner’s argument.” Available at 
http://mateusaraujo.info/2018/10/24/the-flaw-in-frauchiger-and-renners-argument/ 
Brukner, Č. (2018). “A no-go theorem for observer-independent facts.” Entropy, 20: 350. 
Bub, J. (2018). “In defense of a «single-world» interpretation of quantum mechanics.” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, on line first. 
 14
Castelvecchi, D. (2018). “Reimagining of Schrödinger’s cat breaks quantum mechanics —and 
stumps physicists.” Nature, September 18, 2018. Avaliable at 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06749-8. See also Scientific American, available 
at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/reimagining-of-schroedingers-cat-breaks-
quantum-mechanics-mdash-and-stumps-physicists1/ 
del Rio, L. (2018). “Frauchiger-Renner no-go theorem for single-world interpretations of quantum 
theory.” Available at https://www.perimeterinstitute.ca/videos/journal-club-frauchiger-renner-
no-go-theorem-single-world-interpretations-quantum-theory. 
Dieks, D. (2019). “Quantum mechanics and perspectivalism.” Forthcoming in O. Lombardi, S. 
Fortin, C. López, and F. Holik (eds.), Quantum Worlds. Perspectives on the Ontology of 
Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Frauchiger, D. and Renner, R. (2016). “Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be 
self-consistent.” Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.07422v1. 
Frauchiger, D. and Renner, R. (2018). “Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of 
itself.” Nature Communications, 9: 3711. The page numbers are taken from the version 
available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.07422v2.  
Healey, R. (2018), “Quantum theory and the limits of objectivity.” Foundations of Physics, 48: 
1568-1589. 
Laloë, F. (2018). “Can quantum mechanics be considered consistent? a discussion of Frauchiger 
and Renner’s argument.” Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06396v3. 
Lazarovici, D. and Hubert, M. (2018). “How quantum mechanics can consistently describe the use 
of itself.” Avaliable at  
https://dustinlazarovici.com/wp-content/uploads/comment_renner_new.pdf. 
Lombardi, O. and Dieks, D. (2017). “Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics.” In E. N. Zalta 
(ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/qm-modal/. 
Rovelli, C. (1996). “Relational quantum mechanics.” International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 
35: 1637-1678. 
Sudbery, A. (2017). “Single-world theory of the extended Wigner’s friend experiment.” 
Foundations of Physics, 47: 658-669. 
Wigner, E. (1961). “Remarks on the mind-body question.” Pp. 284-301 in I. J. Good (ed.), The 
Scientist Speculates. London: Heinemann. 
Würsten, F. (2018). “Searching for errors in the quantum world.” 20.11.2018, Highlights, Reseach, 
Department of Physics, ETH Zürich. Available at https://www.ethz.ch/en/news-and-
 15
events/eth-news/news/2018/09/errors-in-the-quantum-world.html. See also Science Daily, 
September 18, 2018, avaliable at 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/09/180918114438.htm. 
